Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm: A Legistlative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. Ebay Inc. Problem by Sunderji, Fara S.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 74 Issue 2 Article 19 
2005 
Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark 
Liability Storm: A Legistlative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. Ebay 
Inc. Problem 
Fara S. Sunderji 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fara S. Sunderji, Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm: A 
Legistlative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. Ebay Inc. Problem, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 909 (2005). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss2/19 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Protecting Online Auction Sites from the Contributory Trademark Liability Storm: 
A Legistlative Solution to the Tiffany Inc. v. Ebay Inc. Problem 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2000, Vassar College. I would like to thank 
my family and friends for their continuing support and Professor Joel Reidenberg for his comments on 
the early drafts of this Note. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss2/19 
PROTECTING ONLINE AUCTION SITES FROM
THE CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK LIABILITY
STORM: A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE
TIFFANY INC. V. EBAYINC. PROBLEM
Fara S. Sunderji*
INTRODUCTION
Instead of walking to the store on a rainy day, I logged onto eBay's
website' to look for a new piece of jewelry. A simple search of the
keyword "tiffany" drew 10,711 results, 3646 in the jewelry and watch
category. 2 Almost all of the pieces were listed as "guaranteed," "authentic
Tiffany & Co.," or "100% authentic," but all were listed well below the
genuine Tiffany's price.3 Without the ability to physically inspect before
purchase, I, as an online consumer, had to trust the seller's description if I
wanted to buy an item. However, according to Tiffany Inc. ("Tiffany"),
"[t]he eBay website is currently, and has been, infested with many
thousands of counterfeit Tiffany items."'4 In fact, Tiffany contends that the
bulk of its branded jewelry offered on eBay is counterfeit. 5
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2000, Vassar College. I
would like to thank my family and friends for their continuing support and Professor Joel
Reidenberg for his comments on the early drafts of this Note.
1. EBay, http://www.ebay.com (last visited Sept. 29 2005).
2. Id. (search "All Categories" for "tiffany"; then follow "see all tiffany items"
hyperlink).
3. For example, a bracelet that retails for $285 directly from Tiffany, Tiffany & Co.,
http://www.tiffany.com (search "ten row chain heart bracelet"), is offered for a "Buy It
Now" (fixed price sale) price of $129.99, EBay, supra note 1 (search "5026943438") (eBay
only allows access to completed auctions for a limited time, so this listing is on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
4. First Amended Complaint para. 20, Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc., 2004 WL 1413904
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2004) (No. 04CV4607) [hereinafter Complaint]. Tiffany claims that as a
result of this infestation thousands of consumers have been defrauded on eBay because they
thought they were bidding on authentic Tiffany jewelry. Id. Conversely, some eBay users
might deny that they are being defrauded because they knowingly purchase counterfeit
Tiffany jewelry. However, the trademark law principle of post-sale confusion operates as a
justification to protect against the confusion of unsuspecting third parties who view the
buyer's counterfeit item. See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-
Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955). For more information on post-
sale confusion, see Anne M. McCarthy, Note, The Post-Sale Confusion Doctrine: Why the
General Public Should Be Included in the Likelihood of Confusion Inquiry, 67 Fordham L.
Rev. 3337 (1999).
5. Complaint, supra note 4, para. 22.
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To help solve this problem, 6 Tiffany filed suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York against eBay Inc. ("eBay") for
"facilitation and participation in the counterfeiting, infringement and false
advertising of the federally registered trademarks owned, licensed and/or
used by Tiffany." 7 Tiffany's primary claim amounts to accusing eBay of
contributory trademark infringement for the individuals who use eBay to
sell counterfeit Tiffany products.8  Tiffany argues that eBay should
maintain primary responsibility for monitoring counterfeiters. 9 There is no
doubt that the sellers' conduct is illegal,' 0 but to what extent does eBay, or
any other online auction site, bear responsibility for its sellers' actions?11
While this Note deals only with U.S. law, the resolution of this issue will
reach outside the U.S. because eBay's virtual marketplace brings American
buyers and sellers together with foreign buyers and sellers.12 Thus, this suit
will significantly impact trademark owners, other online auction sites,
counterfeiters, and the millions of registered eBay users worldwide.
6. In its compliant, Tiffany claims that $30 billion worth of counterfeit goods are sold
annually over the Internet, accounting for "[ten] percent of the total counterfeit market." Id.
14. In 1989, the Seventh Circuit called the general sale of counterfeit merchandise
"endemic-perhaps pandemic." Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir.
1989). The court also pointed out that filing suit against each direct infringer is not feasible,
nor would it help stop counterfeiting. Id. For suggestions on how both the trademark
owners' counsel and the auction sites' counsel should respond to alleged online
counterfeiting on an auction website, see The Comm. on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition, Online Auction Sites and Trademark Infringement Liability, 58 Rec. Ass'n B.
N.Y. City 236, 249-50 (2003) [hereinafter The Comm. on Trademarks].
7. Complaint, supra note 4, para. 4. This Note will only discuss the federal claims
dealing with counterfeiting and infringement.
8. See Michael Bobelian, Tiffany and eBay Clash over Sales of Fake Goods, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 19, 2004, at 1.
9. See Complaint, supra note 4, para. 31.
10. The federal statute provides:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... shall be liable in a
civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000).
11. See Bobelian, supra note 8, at 1.
12. EBay Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 38 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal1065088/000095013405008154/f07687e 10vq.htm
[hereinafter eBay Quarterly Report]. Currently, eBay has online auction websites in the
United States, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong,
India, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore,
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 6. As
eBay expands its empire in places like China, cross-border trade should rise from its current
level of fifteen percent. Meg and the Power of Many, The Economist, June 11, 2005, at 65,
67. For information on the related problem of Internet jurisdiction, see Joel R. Reidenberg,
Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1951 (2005).
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This is an issue of first impression in the United States. 13 However, in
2001, Rolex sued eBay's German subsidiary, 14 claiming trademark
infringement for the sale of watches clearly marked "as 'fake' or
'replica."" ' 5 Rolex sought damages and an injunction preventing the sale of
all counterfeit Rolex branded watches on the site. 16 Both the lower and the
appellate level courts found in favor of eBay because of its lack of
knowledge about the specific instances of trademark infringement. 17
Nevertheless, the Federal Supreme Court of Germany ruled that while eBay
cannot be financially responsible for damages, 18 it must implement a
monitoring system to prevent the listing of goods marked as counterfeit and
other goods that are obviously fake. 19
This Note examines whether an online auction site, such as eBay, 20
should be liable in the United States when a third party sells counterfeit
goods through the website's services. Under current case law, Tiffany and
eBay both have equally credible arguments. In order to balance rights
owners' and online auction sites' competing interests, this Note looks to
13. See Cathleen Flahardy, Tiffany & Co. Cracks Down on Ebay Counterfeiters: Kate
Spade and Prada Join the Fight to Protect Their Brands, Corp. Legal Times, Sept. 2004, at
20. However, federal courts have dealt with contributory trademark liability in the context
of traditional marketplaces, as opposed to virtual ones. See infra Part I.D. Additionally, in
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., one federal court grappled with the issue of eBay's contributory
copyright liability for the sale of counterfeit documentaries. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal.
2001). The court specifically considered "whether eBay [could] be held secondarily liable
for providing the type of selling platform/forum and services that it provided, however
limited or automated in nature, to sellers of counterfeit copies of the film 'Manson."' Id. at
1087. However, the court correctly noted that the Hendrickson case revolved around the law
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which does not impact trademark
cases. Id. at 1083. In the end, the court held that the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA
shielded eBay from contributory copyright liability. Id. at 1094. For more information on
the DMCA and the Hendrickson case, see infra Part I.D. For a discussion of the Lanham
Act claims in Hendrickson, see infra Part I.C.3.c.
14. EBay Deutschland, http://www.ebay.de (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). Rolex also
sued another auction site, ricardo.de, under similar circumstances. Christian Ruetz, Case
Comment: Germany: Trade Marks-Auction Sites' Liability for Counterfeits, 27 Eur. Intell.
Prop. Rev. N67, N67 (2005).
15. Ruetz, supra note 14, at N67. However, Tiffany's case differs from the German case
because of the differences in American trademark law. See The Comm. on Trademarks,
supra note 6, at 250.
16. EBay Quarterly Report, supra note 12, at 16. In essence, the plaintiff requested that
eBay filter out listings in advance that are marked as counterfeit or are listed below a certain
amount. Henning Hartwig, Case Comment: Online Auctioning Between Trade Mark and
Consumer Protection, 27 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 319, 320 (2005).
17. Hartwig, supra note 16, at 319-20.
18. EBay's lack of financial responsibility is due to European statutory provisions. Id. at
323.
19. Id. Accordingly, eBay "could not be held responsible for trade mark infringements
that are not detectable by such a filtering process (for example, a forged Rolex watch being
offered for a price appropriate to an original and without a suggestion of its forged
character)." Id. at 323. For more information on this case, see id.; Ruetz, supra note 14.
20. This Note will focus on eBay because of the law suit by Tiffany, but the issues
discussed are of relevance to other online auction sites. For a current list of online auction
websites see The Auction Board, http://theauctionboard.com (follow "Online Auctions"
hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
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Title II of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") to create a
parallel legislative solution. A safe harbor designed specifically to address
the contributory trademark infringement occurring at online auction sites
best resolves the dilemma at hand.
Part I of this Note presents the reader with the necessary background to
understand the conflict between Tiffany and eBay by providing the reader
with a description of eBay, a brief summary of the policies behind
American trademark law, a review of contributory trademark infringement
in a physical setting and in cyberspace, and a discussion of the DMCA's
safe harbor provisions, for comparison. In Part II, this Note analyzes the
arguments for and against eBay's contributory liability under the current
case law. Finally, Part III argues that neither of the positions presented in
Part II adequately resolves the problem of counterfeiting on eBay. Instead,
this Note recommends that Congress enact trademark legislation similar to
the DMCA's safe harbor to resolve the current dilemma and balance both
parties' interests.
I. EBAY'S HISTORY AND THE APPLICABLE LAW
This first part provides a framework for understanding the conflict
between trademark owners and online auction sites. Part I.A outlines
eBay's operations, with specific attention towards how it currently
addresses counterfeiting. Part I.B summarizes the pertinent parts of the
Lanham Act and its policies. Part I.C analyzes the common law origins of
contributory trademark infringement and how the doctrine has evolved in
both physical and cyber settings. Finally, Part I.D looks at contributory
copyright liability in the context of the DMCA.
A. EBay-The Online Auction Site
In its short ten-year existence, eBay 21 has developed from a
programmer's holiday weekend project 22 into the fastest growing company
ever.23 In the fall of 1995, the first eBay bidder won an auction for a
"broken laser pointer" with a $14 bid.24 In the year 2004, the registered
users of eBay collectively bought $34.2 billion worth of merchandise. 25
They purchased everything from jewelry and beauty supplies to cars and
21. The online auction website now known as eBay began its life with the official name
AuctionWeb, and operated as such until September 1, 1997. Adam Cohen, The Perfect Store
79 (2002). However, from the beginning, users referred to the site as eBay. Id.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Patricia Sellers, eBay's Secret, Fortune, Oct. 10, 2004, at 160, 162, 168 (noting that
eBay grew faster than Microsoft, Yahoo, or Dell "during the first eight years of its
existence").
24. Cohen, supra note 21, at 4-5.
25. EBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 22 (Dec. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/00009501 3405003827/fD5426e 1 Ovk.htm#
010 [hereinafter eBay Annual Report]. This figure represents the "[t]otal value of all
successfully closed listings between users on eBay's trading platforms during the year,
regardless of whether the buyer and seller actually consummated the transaction." Id. at 23.
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antiques. 26 With more than 135 million registered users, 56 million of them
active in 2004,27 eBay, known as "The World's Online Marketplace," 28 has
become a fixture in modem commerce. 29 Sellers include everyone from
college students who sell old textbooks30 to entrepreneurs who have created
at-home careers selling collectables 31 to traditional retailers who unload
extra stock.32
EBay's concept is simple. 33 Like most online auction sites, eBay states
that even though it is "commonly referred to as an online auction web site,
it is important to realize that [eBay] [is] not a traditional 'auctioneer.'
Instead, the [s]ite acts as a venue." 34 It provides a virtual space where
sellers and buyers can meet, much like a flea market, with some of the
characteristics of classified advertisements and auctions. 35  Before
26. See EBay, supra note 1.
27. EBay Annual Report, supra note 25, at 3. An active user is "any user who bid on,
bought, or listed an item during the prior 12-month period." Id.
28. EBay, supra note 1.
29. EBay "accounts for about one-quarter of all e-commerce sales, excluding groceries
and travel." Meg and the Power of Many, supra note 12, at 65. "For every $100 spent online
worldwide, $14 was spent on eBay." At 10 Years, Has eBay Lost lts Allure?, cnn.com, June
6, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/intemet/O6/27/ebay.at.crossroads.ap/index.html.
30. See EBay, supra note 1 (follow "Books" hyperlink under "Categories"; then follow
"Textbooks, Education" hyperlink under "Categories within Books").
31. See At 10 Years, Has eBay Lost Its Allure?, supra note 29. EBay estimates that
about 500,000 Americans earn at least some of their living by selling goods on eBay. Meg
and the Power of Many, supra note 12, at 65.
32. See EBay, supra note 1. Dell and Best Buy count themselves among the traditional
retailers who sell extra stock on eBay. Sellers, supra note 23, at 172. Tiffany, like many
high end retailers, does not sell extra stock to resellers or through any other indirect means.
Complaint, supra note 4, paras. 10-11.
33. Despite its simplicity, eBay's modem version of the person-to-person ("P2P")
market greatly improves upon the economically inefficient traditional forms, like classified
advertisements and flea markets. David Bunnell, The Ebay Phenomenon: Business Secrets
Behind the World's Hottest Internet Company 13 (2000). In traditional P2P markets,
"[p]ricing benchmarks are difficult or impossible to find." Id. Additionally, geography
frequently impedes the meeting of buyers and sellers. Id. However, eBay solves both of
these problems. Id. at 14; see also Cohen, supra note 21, at 10. Further, eBay's system
"efficiently mov[es] goods from people who value them less to people who value them
more," and thus "eBay increases 'social utility."' Id.; see also id. at 6-7. Moreover, eBay
does not have the burden of carrying stock, like traditional retailers. Meg and the Power of
Many, supra note 12, at 66.
34. Your User Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2005); see also, e.g., uBid User Agreement, http://www.ubid.com (follow
"Help" hyperlink; then follow "User Agreement" under "Browse Help") (showing uBid's
user agreement with identical language).
35. See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(describing eBay's business as having "elements of both traditional swap meets-where
sellers pay for use of space to display their goods-and traditional auction houses-where
goods are sold via the highest bid process"); What Is eBay?,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/newtoebay/questions/about-ebay.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2005). The court in Hendrickson takes judicial notice of www.ebay.com, as should the
unfamiliar reader. 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
2005]
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participating, all users must accept eBay's User Agreement.3 6 Then, sellers
can auction their items for a fixed amount of time to the highest bidder or
for a set price.37 Sellers choose an eBay category, write a title, describe
their item, and dictate payment options.38  Buyers browse through
categories or keyword search to reach the listings, which may include
photographs, before bidding. 39 Sellers pay fees for these basic services.
40
Initially, eBay charges an insertion fee for listing an item.4 1 However, it
also charges a final value fee 42 if the item is sold.4 3 Sellers also pay fees for
additional services such as multiple pictures, reserve prices, or special
listing placement. 44 In 2004, eBay's consolidated net revenues equaled
$3.27 billion.45
EBay's creator, Pierre Omidyar, conceived of his website as a place
"where a social contract [would] prevail[]. ' '46 To this day, Omidyar
36. For a copy of eBay's User Agreement, see Your User Agreement, supra note 34.
Under the rules of the User Agreement, users agree not to sell illegal or counterfeit items. Id.
paras. 5.1, 6.2.
37. What Is eBay?, supra note 35. Seventy percent of the total value of goods are sold
through the auction format, while thirty percent account for the fixed-price sales. Meg and
the Power of Many, supra note 12, at 66.
38. How to Sell, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/basics.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
39. How Do I Buy an item?, http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/questions/buy-item.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
40. Creating a Seller's Account, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/seller-account.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
41. Fees as of September 29, 2005, are as follows:
Initial or Reserve Price Fee
$0.01-$0.99 $0.25
$1.00-$9.99 $0.35
$10.00-$24.99 $0.60
$25.00-$49.99 $1.20
$50.00-$199.99 $2.40
$200.00-$499.99 $3.60
$500.00+ $4.80
EBay.com Fees, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
42. Fees as of September 23, 2005, are as follows:
Winning Bid Fee
item not sold $0.00
$0.01-$25.00 5.25% of the winning bid
$25.01-$1,000.00 5.25% of the initial $25.00 ($1.31) plus 2.75%
of the remaining ($25.01-$1,000.00)
$1,000.01+ 5.25% of the initial $25.00 ($1.31) plus 2.75%
of the initial $25.01-$1,000.00 ($26.81) plus
1.50% of the remaining ($1,000.01+)
Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Many users complained about the January 2005 fee increase, which was
implemented to "balance the market, for instance to produce more differentiation between
standard listings and optional features which sellers can pay extra for." Meg and the Power
of Many, supra note 12, at 66.
45. EBay Annual Report, supra note 25, at 22. EBay's advertising and non-transaction
revenue contributed $94.3 million to the total figure. Id. at 25.
46. Cohen, supra note 21, at 8; see also Sellers, supra note 23, at 172 ("Omidyar
envisioned eBay as a self-regulating marketplace where users are responsible for their
trades.").
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requests that eBay users deal honestly with strangers.47 Initially, when
disputing users emailed him, Omidyar encouraged them to work the
problem out amongst themselves. 48  To this end, eBay created the
"Feedback Forum."49  Through this system, users criticized and praised
other users for the entire community to see.50 Praises and criticisms impact
users through numerical ratings which indicate reputation. 51 Ultimately,
this allows the community to deal with problem users in the manner it sees
fit.52
The eBay community was further strengthened with the advent of the
message boards, which divided into the "Q&A Board" and the "eBay
Cafe."' 53 The eBay Cafe board developed a quasi-neighborhood watch
system, where regular contributors would virtually gang up on those who
committed fraud or those who unfairly abused the Feedback Forum to run
others out of business.54
Despite the community's strength and wherewithal for self-regulation,
eBay eventually needed to officially deal with fraud.5 5 In 1997, eBay's first
lawyer developed the "Legal Buddy" program in response to a
47. Letter from our Founder, http://pages.ebay.com/help/newtoebay/founder-letter.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
48. Cohen, supra note 21, at 27.
49. Id. For an analysis of the Feedback Forum and its faults, see Mary M. Calkins, My
Reputation Always Had More Fun than Me: The Failure of eBay's Feedback Model to
Effectively Prevent Online Auction Fraud, 7 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 33 (2001).
50. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 27-28. Unfortunately, this system of commentary has
given rise to defamation claims against eBay. See Sewali K. Patel, Note, Immunizing
Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims: How Far Should
Courts Go?, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 647 (2002).
51. See Bunnell, supra note 33, at 56. For further information on the Feedback Forum,
see id. at 56-58; What Is Feedback?,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/questions/feedback.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
52. Cohen, supra note 21, at 27-28. However, when a user's feedback score drops
below a certain level, eBay de-registers the user. Id.
53. See id. at 28-29, 50. Today, eBay contains a community section, where users can
discuss eBay, chat about unrelated topics, learn about eBay, and ask questions about eBay.
Community Overview, http://hub.ebay.com/community?ssPageName=h:h:over:US (last
visited Sept. 29, 2005).
54. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 52.
55. Additionally, eBay intervened to ban certain items such as firearms, alcohol,
tobacco, murder memorabilia less than a century old, one's virginity, and Nazi items except
documents, coins, and historical books. Sellers, supra note 23, at 172. Enforcement of these
prohibitions appears to be at least partially reactive to another user reporting the violation.
See Human Remains, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/remains.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2005) (citing "listing cancellation" as one of the results of offering human remains in
violation of eBay's policies). However, eBay can likely screen out, by keyword, prohibited
items automatically before the listing even appears online. See Complaint, supra note 4,
para. 34. For a complete list of prohibited items, see Prohibited and Restricted Items:
Overview, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/items-ov.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
Despite the ban on firearms, guns continue to be sold on eBay. See Caught in the Net: eBay,
Foreign Pol'y, Jan. 1, 2005, at 92. As a member of the British Parliament explained, sellers
list an empty box and then he or she adds a free gun when shipping to the winning bidder. Id.
For more information on the problem of the sale of stolen merchandise on eBay, see David
Rubenstein, EBay: The Cyber Swap Meet, 13 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 1 (2004).
2005]
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watchmaker's complaint that users were selling counterfeit watches on
eBay. 56 Through the program, eBay agreed to remove illegal listings from
the site after the company combed through the listings to identify the
infringing items. 57 Nevertheless, eBay made it clear that it would not
"tak[e] responsibility for actively vetting its millions of auctions in
advance" because such "an undertaking ... would be so labor-intensive it
could... put eBay out of business. s58 Additionally, such a policy would
contradict eBay's laissez-faire business model. 59
Notwithstanding eBay's current contention that "only 0.01% of
transactions are reported as fraudulent," 60 eBay continued the Legal Buddy
program's objectives with the Verified Rights Owners Program
("VeRO"). 61 Through VeRO, eBay now helps to remove infringing
listings, but rights owners 62 must first file a Notice of Claimed Infringement
form 63 under the penalty of perjury in order for an item to be removed. 64
VeRO also offers participants the opportunity to create an informational
page to assist eBay users.65 EBay itself prohibits the sale of counterfeit
items66 and provides users with basic information concerning trademarks
and domain names. 67 However, users themselves can only report "listing
56. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 91.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Meg and the Power of Many, supra note 12, at 66 (quoting Meg Whitman, CEO, as
saying, "We make a small number of rules and get the heck out of the way, because the
entrepreneurial talents of our users will solve a lot of the problems").
60. Sellers, supra note 23, at 172. For a discussion of all types of online auction fraud,
see Miriam R. Albert, E-Buyer Beware: Why Online Auction Fraud Should Be Regulated,
39 Am. Bus. L.J. 575 (2002).
61. Cohen, supra note 21, at 214. EBay also cooperates with law enforcement
personnel, who search the site for illegal merchandise including endangered species and
postal meters. Carrie Kirby, Keeping Order Online, S.F. Chron., Jan. 29, 2001, at D5. In one
case, eBay turned over the address of a user selling a baby tiger without a subpoena to a
special agent for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Id. However, the privacy issues related
to this practice are yet to be resolved. Id.
62. Trademark owners and copyright owners are both participants in this program. See
Cohen, supra note 21, at 214.
63. For a copy of the form, see Notice of Claimed Infringement,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/NOCIl.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
64. Id. These procedures fulfill eBay's and the rights owners' duties under the DMCA.
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1085 & n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2001); see infra
notes 175-76, 178-85 and accompanying text.
65. EBay Help: Community Standards: Policies and Conduct: eBay's Verified Rights
Owner (VeRO), http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/vero-aboutme.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2005). These "about me" pages provide users with information about the VeRO
participants' trademarks, products, and efforts to prevent illegal sales on eBay. See id
66. Replica, Counterfeit Items and Unauthorized Copies,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/replica-counterfeit.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
67. Trademark and Domain Name Basics,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/trademark.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). This page
gives basic definitions of the terms trademark, trademark infringement, domain name, and
cybersquatting. Id.
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violations or problems with another eBay member," 68 but not potentially
infringing items. 69 Additionally, eBay started daily self monitoring of the
site for infringing items. 70 However, it maintains that "the [s]ite acts as a
venue." 71 Therefore, it has "no control over the quality, safety or legality of
the items advertised, [or] the truth or accuracy of the listings." 72 These
disclaimers, however, may not be enough to protect eBay from legal
liability.
B. The Lanham Act and Its Policies
On July 5, 1946, President Harry S. Truman signed the Lanham Act into
law, the foundation of American federal trademark law. 73 The Lanham Act
was introduced as a bill "to place all matters relating to trademarks in one
statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity ... and [to] [make] relief against
infringement prompt and effective." 74 The Senate decided to modernize
trademark law from the Act of February 20, 1905, in order to "ke[ep] pace
with... commercial development. '75 In order for the Lanham Act to
remain the basis of American trademark law, it has been amended
numerous times to keep pace with technological developments in the
business world.76
The Lanham Act purports to promote three competing policies: (1) to
prevent consumer confusion, (2) to protect the goodwill of businesses, and
68. Customer SafeHarbor, http://pages.ebay.com/help/confidence/problems-support.html
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005). A listing violation is defined as a direct violation of eBay's
policies. See id. EBay's policies are outlined at eBay Policies Overview,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/overview.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
69. See Reporting Listings when You Are Not the Rights Owner,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/confidence/contact-rights-owner.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2005). Even though selling counterfeits directly violates eBay's policies, eBay likely
prevents individual users from reporting infringing items because users are not trained to
identify counterfeits and because competing sellers could damage each others' business by
making frequent reports of infringement. See id. EBay may also have implemented this
policy in response to the notice provisions of the DMCA. See infra note 178-87 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these provisions.
70. My Listing Was Removed Through VeRO,
http://pages.ebay.con/help/confidence/vero-removed-listing.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2005). But see At 10 Years, Has EBay Lost Its Allure?, supra note 29 (noting executive
concern's that "it's impossible to police a site receiving as many as 2,000 new listings per
second").
71. Your User Agreement, supra note 34. But see Hendrickson v. eBay 165 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1084 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (indicating that eBay's self-classification "as merely an
online venue that publishes 'electronic classified ads' is "grossly oversimplifie[d]").
72. Your User Agreement, supra note 34, para. 3.1.
73. Lanham Act, Pub. L. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1051-1127 (2000)). "[T]he purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common
law of unfair competition and trademark protection." Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., concurring) (citing S. Rep. No. 1333, at 4 (1946)).
74. S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274.
75. Id. at4; id. at 1276.
76. See J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §§ 5:5-
5:11 (4th ed. 2004). For a summary of the important amendments to the Lanham Act, see id
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(3) to promote competition within the market. 77 The law against direct
trademark infringement, in the form of counterfeiting, provides an
example.78 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act bars sellers from using others'
trademarks to sell their own goods when the use creates confusion as to the
source of the goods.79 However, this protection does not extend to generic
terms 80 that are necessary to describe certain products. 81 Additionally, the
use of another's trademark that does not cause confusion as to origin,
77. See Windsor, Inc. v. Intravco Travel Ctrs., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513, 1520-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also S. Rep. No. 1333, at 4, as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1275 (citing the three-part rational for trademark protection as "to protect the public from
deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of
reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to
those who have not"); McCarthy, supra note 76, §§ 2:1-2:2. For example, the First Circuit
held that "[t]he injury in an infringement case is ... to the public because of confusion
caused by the similar marks." Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 218
(1st Cir. 1989). The second policy drives the Lanham Act's protection of dilution against
famous marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) (allowing a court to consider "the duration and
extent of the use of the mark" as well as "the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity" to determine if a mark deserves protection); see also TCPIP Holding Co. Inc. v.
Haar Commc'ns Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that "the Dilution Act is
designed solely for the benefit of the sellers"). The processes of registration and cancellation
of trademarks are guided by the final policy. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (explaining that because "no matter how much money and
effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise .... it
cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its
name," trademark protection will not be awarded to generic terms).
78. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982).
[B]latant trademark infringement inhibits competition and subverts both goals of
the Lanham Act. By applying a trademark to goods produced by one other than
the trademark's owner, the infringer deprives the owner of the goodwill which he
spent energy, time, and money to obtain. At the same time, the infringer deprives
the consumer of their ability to distinguish among the goods of the competing
manufacturers.
Id (citations omitted).
79. The statute provides:
a) Civil Action
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
80. "A generic term is one that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the
genus of which the particular product is a species." Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9. The
Abercrombie court provides "ivory" as an example of a generic term when used to refer to
goods produced from elephant tusks. Id. at 9 n.6.
81. Id. at 9.
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sponsorship, or approval is not barred. 82 Thus, this civil penalty protects
the goodwill that businesses build in their trademarks, while it prevents
consumer confusion as to the source of goods and services. 83 By not
restricting the use of necessary words, the statute also allows for
competition in the market among businesses selling similar goods.84
Likewise, non-confusing use allows one to compare his own product to
another's by using the other's trademark. 85 As new trademark issues arise,
the law must continually balance these three main principles to achieve the
correct equilibrium. 86
C. Contributory Trademark Infringement
1. The Origins of Contributory Trademark Infringement: Inwood
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.
Despite Congress's intent to codify trademark law through the Lanham
Act and its numerous amendments, 87 certain important trademark principles
remain only in common law. 88 For example, courts find no statutory
support for contributory trademark liability, 89 but instead rely upon the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion in Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,
Inc. 90
In Inwood, the Court considered whether a manufacturer or distributor of
generic drugs could be held liable for the direct trademark infringement of
pharmacists. 91 In this case, the pharmacists directly infringed trademarks
by intentionally selling generic drugs provided by manufacturers and
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
83. See id.
84. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
85. See August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1995) (praising
comparative advertising because it helps consumers evaluate new products against a familiar
one).
86. See, e.g., H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc. v. William Carter Co., 913 F. Supp. 796, 803-04
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that in trademark suits courts must balance these three policies
against one another).
87. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
88. The exclusion of common law concepts from the Lanham Act does not lead to the
conclusion that Congress intended for the statute to also exclude them. See Inwood Labs.,
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., concurring). But see
NuPulse, Inc. v. Schlueter Co., 853 F.2d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 1988) ("When we view the
Lanham Act in its totality, it is clear that Congress intended to create a self-contained
statutory device to deal with all kinds of trademark infringement and unfair competition.").
89. Power Test Petroleum Distribs., Inc. v. Manhattan & Queens Corp., 556 F. Supp.
392, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that "the doctrine of contributory infringement has
developed as a judicial gloss on the infringement provision of the Lanham Act").
90. 456 U.S. at 844. For a more detailed discussion of Inwood, see Darrel C. Karl, Note,
"Look-Alike" Capsules, Generic Drug Substitution, and the Lanham Act: The Elusive
Contributory Infringement of Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 32 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 345 (1982).
91. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 846.
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distributors under brand names.92 In announcing its holding, the Supreme
Court explained that "liability for trademark infringement can extend
beyond those who actually mislabel goods with the mark of another." 93
Consequently, the Court held that a manufacturer or a distributor of generic
drugs could be held contributorily liable for the direct infringing actions of
pharmacists. 94 Relying on William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,95
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, determined the test
to be the following:
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe
a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows
or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the
manufacturer or distributor is contributorily responsible for any harm
done as a result of the deceit. 96
Accordingly, the Inwood fact pattern fell under the latter scenario
because the defendants' liability turned on (1) supplying the drug which
ultimately infringed a trademark and (2) constructive or actual knowledge
of the pharmacists' actions.97 The Court remanded the case to resolve the
factual elements of this test.98 More importantly, the Court's decision
empowered trademark owners to effectively police their marks by holding
more financially sound parties-such as the generic drug manufacturers and
distributors in Inwood-accountable. 99  Additionally, trademark owners
benefited from the ability to attack one manufacturer or distributor who
contributed to the direct counterfeiting of many individual pharmacists,
rather than mount separate suits against each pharmacist.100 The following
section examines the modifications that the Inwood test underwent to fit
landlords and franchisors in a physical setting.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 853.
94. See id. at 855.
95. 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924) (holding that "[t]he wrong was in designedly enabling the
dealers to palm off').
96. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. Another court described contributory trademark
infringement as "'suppl[ying] the ammunition' that allow[s] the wrongful user to complete
the infringement." Power Test Petroleum Distrs., Inc. v. Manhattan & Queens Corp., 556 F.
Supp. 392, 394 (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp.
479, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
97. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854.
98. Id. at 856-59.
99. See Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1989); cf In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that suing individual
copyright infringers is futile and unhelpful to the larger problem).
100. See Louis Vuitton, 875 F.2d at 588.
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2. Contributory Trademark Liability in Physical Settings
a. Landlords
After Inwood, lower courts could freely apply the law of contributory
trademark infringement to manufacturers and distributors who supplied
products which eventually infringed a trademark, but the Inwood Court did
not define any further boundaries to this doctrine. 10 1 Nevertheless, under
Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.,102 and
subsequently in Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop 10 3 and
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,104 federal courts applied the Inwood
test for contributory trademark infringement to landlords, including flea
market operators.105
The flea market in Hard Rock Cafe operated by renting stalls to vendors,
charging fees for reservations and storage, charging admission fees to
customers, and running concession stands. 10 6 However, the operator paid
for general advertising and crowd control security. 107 When renting the
stalls, the vendors agreed to the rules prohibiting sales of illegal products
like counterfeit goods. 10 8 Among their other duties, two security guards
and one manager walked around the market a few times per day looking for
violations of the operator's rules. 109
101. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996)
(indicating that "[t]he Court in Inwood, however, laid down no limiting principle that would
require defendant to be a manufacturer or distributor"); Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v.
Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that "it is not clear
how the doctrine applies to people who do not actually manufacture or distribute the good
that is ultimately palmed off").
102. 955 F.2dat 1149.
103. 855 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding "that plaintiff has pleaded a legally
sufficient cause of action against [the landlord] ... for contributory [trademark]
infringement" based on the authority of Inwood and Hard Rock Cafe). Importantly, the
Tiffany case is also in the Southern District of New York. Complaint, supra note 4.
104. 76 F.3d at 265. "Hard Rock Cafe's application of the Inwood test is sound; a swap
meet can not disregard its vendors' blatant trademark infringements with impugnity. Thus,
Fonovisa has also stated a claim for contributory trademark infringement." Id.
105. In spite of the Hard Rock Cafe court's affirmation of the theory of contributory
trademark liability, the court rejected the possibility that landlords might be vicariously
liable for any direct infringement by their tenants. Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150. The
court explained that vicarious liability would require "that the defendant and the infringer
have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions
with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the infringing product." Id. In
this case, the facts did not support such a finding. Id.
106. Id. at 1146.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. Similarly, in Fonovisa, the defendant, Cherry Auction, operated a swap meet, by
renting booth space to individual vendors and charging an entrance fee to customers.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 260 (9th Cir. 1996). These fees covered
general advertising and parking. Id. Nevertheless, Cherry Auction reserved the right to eject
vendors for any reason. Id.
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In order to apply the Inwood test, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in Hard Rock Cafe, drew a parallel between a landlord,
who under tort law "is responsible for the torts of those it permits on its
premises" if the landlord has actual or constructive knowledge of the
activities, 110 and a manufacturer or distributor, who can be contributorily
liable as explained in Inwood.I l l Even though a flea market operator is not
supplying the goods that ultimately infringe, it supplies "the necessary
marketplace" for the direct infringers to sell their counterfeit
merchandise."12 Without the space, the direct infringers could not easily
continue their activities. 113 To distinguish, the court noted in dicta that a
temporary service provider who, for example, supplies services to set up a
flea market stand, might not be contributorily liable even if it knew of the
direct infringement. 1 14 A vendor could likely seek help from someone
else 115 or complete the setup himself.
Therefore under this modified Inwood test, a defendant's liability would
turn on (1) supplying a necessary product that the recipient utilizes to
directly infringe a trademark, and (2) knowing or having a reason to know,
through actual or constructive knowledge, of the direct infringer's
actions.1 16 In employing the Hard Rock Cafe analysis, courts have also
focused on the level of supervision and control each landlord maintained
over the direct infringers. 117
While the second prong of the Inwood test remained constant, the Hard
Rock Cafe court more fully developed the knowledge standard."l 8 In
finding that the flea market operator could be contributorily liable for the
110. HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
111. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. According to the Supreme Court, the
manufacturer or distributor must also know of the infringements taking place or have reason
to know of them. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).
112. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265. In the contributory copyright section of the opinion, the
court calls the operator's provisions a "material contribution" to the direct infringement
because the direct infringer could not act without the "space, utilities, parking, advertising,
plumbing, and customers." Id. at 264. Similarly, a regular landlord provides the place for the
direct infringer to sell his counterfeit wares. See Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift
Shop, 855 F. Supp. 648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). However, the test for contributory copyright
liability turns on whether "[o]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another." Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at
264.
113. See Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.corn Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (D.
Md. 2001).
114. HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148.
115. Fare Deals, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 690.
116. See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264; cf Mini Maid Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., Inc.,
967 F.2d 1516, 1522 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (holding for the possibility of franchisor contributory
liability under a similar test).
117. SB Designs v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 338 F. Supp. 2d 904, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(acknowledging that "[t]he Seventh Circuit's expansion of contributory liability is premised
on a defendant's direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to
infringe the plaintiffs mark"); accord Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1999); Fare Deals, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 689.
118. HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
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trademark infringement of the independent sellers, the Seventh Circuit
noted that the operator "has no affirmative duty to take precautions against
the sale of counterfeits." '"19  Nevertheless, the operator will be held
accountable for being aware of what a reasonable person would know.' 20
Additionally, the court restated that "a person... [who] suspect[s]
wrongdoing and [who] deliberately fail[s] to investigate" is willfully blind
and is considered knowledgeable under the Lanham Act. 121 To this end, the
Seventh Circuit observed in dicta that the manager of the flea market had
the opportunity to see the counterfeit t-shirts' cut labels and low sale price,
from which the manager could have reasonably concluded that the
merchandise was counterfeit. 122 Nevertheless, he failed to investigate.1 23
On the other hand, the court noted that the trademark owner, Hard Rock
Cafe, had not publicized that it was the sole source for genuine Hard Rock
Cafe t-shirts, nor did consumers know that genuine t-shirts are never lower
quality with cut labels. 124
b. Franchisors
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Mini Maid Services Co. v. Maid
Brigade Systems, Inc.125 also provided guidance to lower courts applying
the knowledge prong of this test. 126 First, the court urged that district
courts examine "the nature and extent of the communication between [the
accused contributory infringer] and [the direct infringer] regarding the
infringing acts."' 27 Additionally, courts should scrutinize "the extent and
nature of the violations."'128 The Eleventh Circuit explained that with
systematic and major trademark infringement comes a higher probability of
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing its own opinion in Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 590 (7th Cir.
1989)). As the Hard Rock Cafe court points out, the difference in finding actual
knowledge/willful blindness and reason to know will determine the award of attorneys fees.
Id. at 1151. In a footnote, the court noted that willful blindness is determined under a
subjective standard, while reason to know falls under an objective standard. Id. at 1151 n.5.
122. Id. at 1149.
123. Id.
124. Id. (comparing Louis Vuitton, 875 F.2d at 590, because "genuine Vuitton or Gucci
bags [are] unlikely to display poor workmanship or purple vinyl linings"). As a matter of
procedure, the Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the lower court to determine the factual
issue of knowledge. Id. at 1150.
125. 967 F.2d 1516, 1522 (lth Cir. 1992) (holding that a "franchisor may be held
accountable only if it intentionally induced its franchisees to infringe another's trademark or
if it knowingly participated in a scheme of trademark infringement carried out by its
franchisees").
126. Id. The Eleventh Circuit specifically announced these standards in order to limit the
contributory liability of franchisors with "renegade franchisee[s]." Id. at 1522 n.4. In this
case, the plaintiff sued a franchisor for the trademark infringement of a franchisee. Id. at
1518.
127. Id. at 1522.
128. Id.
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knowledge. 129 Lastly, in certain circumstances, contributory liability could
derive from "a bad faith refusal to exercise a clear contractual power to halt
the infringing activities." 130  However, an established contractual
relationship is the prerequisite for liability in this circumstance. 131
3. Contributory Trademark Liability in Cyberspace
This section explores the application of the concepts developed in the
physical world to cyberspace trademark cases. First, Part I.C.3.a addresses
the contributory trademark liability of domain name registrars. Part I.C.3.b
discusses the contributory liability of Internet Service Providers who host
domains. Finally, Part I.C.3,c focuses on the trademark portion of
Hendrickson v. eBay Inc.,132 where eBay was charged under printer-
publisher liability.
a. Domain Name Registrars
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,133 the Ninth Circuit
had the opportunity to apply the principles of Hard Rock Cafe to domain
names. The court held that a domain name registrar 134 could not be
contributorily liable for the trademark infringement caused by a domain
name 135 because it only provided a service, not a product. 136 Both the
district court and the appellate court also stressed that the defendant, unlike
the defendant in Fonovisa, could not "'reasonably be expected to monitor
the Internet' for evidence of infringement by its registrants.137 Such a task
129. Id.
130. Id. The court specifically created this list of inquiries to protect franchisors from
renegade franchisees. Id. at 1522 n.4.
131. See id. at 1522.
132. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
133. 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). This case predated the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act of 1999. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). However, analysis of this case is
still useful because of its discussion of Fonovisa and Hard Rock Cafe.
134. The defendant's services consisted of two features in addition to the actual
registration: (1) running a check for duplicate domain names and (2) maintaining a directory
to link domain names with the internet protocol numbers of the servers. Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aft'd, 194 F.3d
980 (9th Cir. 1999).
135. Direct infringement occurs when the domain name, also a trademark registered to
another party, is used in commerce and in connection with the sale, offer for sale,
distribution, or advertising of goods or services. See id. at 950. The act of registering a
domain name, equal to or confusingly similar to a trademark, is not infringement. See id at
961.
136. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 984. First, the court identified the two-prong test: (1) did the
domain name registrar supply a product and (2) did the domain name registrar have actual or
constructive knowledge of any direct infringement. Id. However, the court found it
unnecessary to answer the knowledge prong because it affirmed the district court's finding
that the defendant did not supply a product, but a service. Id. at 984-85. Second, it continued
with its analysis by examining the level of control and monitoring, as per Fonovisa and Hard
Rock Cafe. Id. at 985.
137. Id. (quoting Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 951).
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would be too burdensome considering the volume of information on the
Internet. 138 However, in dicta, the district court suggested that an internet
service provider ("ISP") in a similar situation was more like a flea market
operator because it "provide[s] the actual storage and communication for
[the] infringing material."' 139 Then, in a footnote, the court acknowledged
that its analogy might not work because of the Communications Decency
Act of 1996 ("CDA"), 140 which "created a tort immunity for [ISPs]' 14 1
Moreover, the district court recognized that an ISP could not monitor the
limitless number of postings to its websites. 142
b. Internet Service Providers Who Host Domains
Delving deeper into cyberspace in Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall &
Associates,143 the Southern District of New York took up the issue of an
ISP's contributory trademark liability for the infringement of its domain-
hosting customers. 144 In this case, the direct infringer used the ISP's
services to advertise counterfeit Gucci jewelry. 145 At the outset, the court
ruled that Lockheed did not foreclose "the application of contributory
[trademark] infringement in the Internet context."146 Next, it held that the
CDA did not grant the ISP immunity because the CDA was not meant to
change the bounds of intellectual property law. 147 Accordingly, the court
found that the plaintiff had stated a triable claim for relief on contributory
138. See Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 951.
139. See id. at 962.
140. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). For more information on the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 ("CDA"), see Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Safe Harbors Against the
Liability Hurricane: The Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 295 (2002).
141. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 962 n.7 (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330-31 (4th Cir. 1997)). Then, the court further complicated matters by citing the CDA's
intent to not change existing intellectual property law. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(d)(2)).
See infra note 147 for the relevant text of the CDA.
142. Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 962 n.7.
143. 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
144. Id. at 410-11. In domain hosting, the internet service provider ("ISP") provides the
user with the ability to run his own website on his own domain, instead of using the ISP's
domain. Id at 411 n.4. (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 n.1
(N.D. Cal. 1999)). This service has been described as parallel to renting office space. Id.
See Gregory C. Walsh, Copyrights & Trademarks: Internet Service Provider Liability for
Contributory Trademark Infringement After Gucci, 2002 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 25, for
further analysis of Gucci.
145. Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 411.
146. Id at 416 (internal quotation omitted).
147. According to the CDA, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000). However, "[n]othing in this section shall
be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property." Id. § 230(e)(2).
The Gucci court discussed the legislative history of the CDA and concluded that the act "was
meant to overrule cases holding ISPs liable for defamation." Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
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trademark infringement against the ISP because no statute barred this
claim. 148
c. EBay as Printer Publisher
Even though the plaintiff in Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc. 149 did not state a
claim for contributory trademark infringement, 150 his Lanham Act claim
warrants discussion here because this case addressed eBay's liability for
trademark infringement occurring on its site. Hendrickson, as the copyright
and trademark/trade dress owner, sued eBay for the third-party sale of
counterfeit copies of a documentary about Charles Manson documentary
through eBay auctions. 151 His trademark infringement claim charged eBay
on the basis of printer-publisher liability. 152 However, in a pretrial order
the court ruled that if it found eBay liable for trademark infringement, eBay
would be treated as an innocent infringer, in part because it had no
knowledge of the direct infringements. 153  Treatment as an innocent
infringer limits the remedies to an injunction against any further publication
of the infringing advertisements in question. 154 Fittingly, the court rejected
the plaintiffs request for an injunction covering all future possible
infringing advertisements because this would require eBay to "monitor the
millions of new advertisements posted on its website each day and
determine, on its own, which of those advertisements infringe[s]. ' 1 55 The
court supported its decision by announcing that eBay did not have a "duty
to monitor its own website for potential trade dress violation[s]."' 156 Like
the Lockheed court, 157 the Central District of California believed that
monitoring in virtual space would be too onerous. 158
D. Contributory Copyright Infringement
Despite their perceived similarities, copyright and trademark law are
quite different. 159 To begin with, copyright protection stems from a direct
148. See Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 416-17, 422.
149. 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
150. Id. at 1095.
151. Id. at 1086.
152. Here, eBay was treated as a direct infringer under 15 U.S.C § 1125(a) (2000)
because it falsely advertised the trademarked goods. Id. at 1086.
153. Id. at 1095.
154. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2).
155. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
158. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
159. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984)
(noting that the Supreme Court has "consistently rejected the proposition that a similar
kinship exists between copyright law and trademark law"); see also McCarthy, supra note
76, § 6:1 (describing the common confusion among the different types of intellectual
property rights).
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constitutional grant of power.160 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
explicitly rejected this direct support for trademark protection. 161
Importantly, the test for contributory copyright liability also differs
substantially from the trademark test. 162 Additionally, the policies behind
each area of law are very distinct. 163 For example, in Mazer v. Stein,164 the
Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the constitutional grant of
copyright law power as an economic philosophy: The state provides
authors with a personal benefit as an incentive to create and disseminate
valuable works of art to the public. 165 Accordingly, copyright law aims to
enrich the public, while the authors' gain is secondary. 166 An author's
natural property right to his or her own creations also serves as a supporting
policy behind the grant of copyright. 167
1. DMCA
Currently, the DMCA also differentiates copyright law from trademark
law, specifically in the area of contributory infringement. 168  While
encouraging the development of the Internet, Title II of the DMCA
simultaneously provides "strong incentives for service providers and
copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright
infringements that take place in the digital networked environment" and
offers service providers guidance on their direct, contributory and vicarious
liability for the infringing actions of their customers. 169 Specifically, § 512
160. U.S. Const. art. I , § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.").
161. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1879) (holding that Congress' power to
regulate trademarks can only come from its power to regulate interstate commerce).
162. Under copyright law, "'[o]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held
liable as a 'contributory' infringer."' Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
264 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). For more information on modem contributory copyright
jurisprudence, see Brandon Michael Francavillo, Comment, Pretzel Logic, the Ninth
Circuit's Approach to Contributory Copyright Infringement Mandates that the Supreme
Court Revisit Sony, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 855 (2004).
163. For a comparison with trademark law policies, see supra note 77 and accompanying
text.
164. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
165. Id. at 219.
166. See id.
167. See David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.03(A) (2005).
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). For an in-depth analysis of Hendrickson v. eBay and
the DMCA, see Lori L. Jones, The Online Copyright Auction: How High Will the Bidding
Go?, 2 J. High Tech. L. 45 (2003).
169. S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 20 (1998). However, the Senate specified that it did not
intend to clarify the current case law of this subject. Id.
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provides a safe harbor that limits service provider ("SP") liability, but it
"does not abolish contributory infringement."' 170
In particular, § 512(c) limits the liability of SPs for the "[i]nformation
[r]esiding on [their] [s]ystems or [n]etworks at [the] [d]irection of [u]sers"
based on three factors: knowledge, financial benefit, and expeditious
removal. 171 First, the SP must lack either actual knowledge of the direct
copyright infringement or the conditions that make the infringement
obvious.172 Alternatively, if the SP learns about the infringement or the
conditions, it must quickly prevent access to the infringing material. 173
Second, the SP must not directly earn money from the infringement if it can
control the infringing activity. 174 Third, if the SP is properly notified,
according to the notification requirements listed in the statute, 175 it must
quickly prevent access to the infringing material. 176 Failure to meet all
three parts of this test results in no shelter from liability for the SP. 17 7
Importantly, the copyright owner must comply with strict notification
requirements in order for the safe harbor to require that the SP prevent
access to the infringing material. 178 To begin with, the notice must be in
170. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). If a service
provider ("SP") does not fit into the safe harbor, it must be evaluated under the contributory
copyright liability test in order to be found liable. See id.
171. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). The text of the statute provides that covered SPs
(A)(i) do[] not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the
material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, [are] not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, act[] expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) do[] not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control
such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3),
respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed
to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.
Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text for notification elements.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).
177. Seeid.
178. See id. § 512(c)(3). The text of the notifications requirements reads as follows:
(3) Elements of notification.
(A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed
infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent
of a service provider that includes substantially the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on
behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed,
or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a
single notification, a representative list of such works at that site.
(iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be
the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which
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written form and directed to the designated agent of the SP. 179 To be
effective, the notice must contain a physical or electronic signature of a
person authorized to represent the copyright owner. 180 In addition, the
notice must identify the copyrighted work, the allegedly infringing material,
and the location of the infringing material. 181 The complaining party's
contact information should also be included. 182 The notice must then
contain a statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that
infringement is occurring. 183 Finally, the complaining party must certify
that all the information in the notice is truthful and that, under penalty of
perjury, he or she is authorized to represent the copyright owner. 184 If the
notification only contains identification of the copyrighted work, contact
is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service
provider to locate the material.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to
contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if
available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be
contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use
of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright
owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and
under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on
behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.
(B)(i) Subject to clause (ii), a notification from a copyright owner or from a
person authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner that fails to comply
substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (A) shall not be considered
under paragraph (1)(A) in determining whether a service provider has actual
knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent.
(ii) In a case in which the notification that is provided to the service
provider's designated agent fails to comply substantially with all the
provisions of subparagraph (A) but substantially complies with clauses (ii),
(iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A), clause (i) of this subparagraph applies only
if the service provider promptly attempts to contact the person making the
notification or takes other reasonable steps to assist in the receipt of
notification that substantially complies with all the provisions of
subparagraph (A).
Id.
179. Id. The statute requires that SPs appoint a designated agent:
(2) Designated Agent.-The limitations on liability established in this subsection
apply to a service provider only if the service provider has designated an agent to
receive notifications of claimed infringement described in paragraph (3), by
making available through its service, including on its website in a location
accessible to the public, and by providing to the Copyright Office, substantially the
following information:
(A) the name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address of the agent.
(B) other contact information which the Register of Copyrights may deem
appropriate.
Id. § 512(c)(2).
180. Id. § 512(c)(3).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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information of the complaining party, and identification of the allegedly
infringing work, the SP must reasonably attempt to contact the complaining
party to obtain the remaining elements of the notice. 185  Incomplete
notification does not, however, provide a basis for an SP's knowledge of
the direct infringement or of the circumstances that make infringement
obvious. 186 Thus, the DMCA safe harbor encourages rights owners and
SPs to cooperate to prevent copyright infringement on the Internet. 187
2. EBay's Contributory Copyright Liability Under the DMCA
The copyright portion of the Hendrickson case provides an especially
pertinent discussion of the DMCA's § 512(c) safe harbor provision and its
requirements.18 8 There, the court identified the main issue as "whether
eBay [could] be held secondarily liable for providing the type of selling
platform/forum and services that it provided, however limited or automated
in nature, to sellers of counterfeit copies of the film 'Manson.' ' ' 189 The
court first considered whether eBay could receive shelter from liability
through the DMCA's safe harbor. 190
The court analyzed eBay's actions under subsection (c) because the
plaintiff charged that users were exploiting eBay's "materials" to directly
infringe the copyright. 191 With respect to the first prong, the court held that
eBay did not have actual or constructive knowledge. 192 The plaintiff's
notice to eBay did not impact this finding because his emails did not
identify the specific infringing items. 193 Therefore, the notification did not
fulfill the section's notice requirements. 194 Without identification of the
infringing items, eBay could not distinguish the legal sales of the Manson
documentary from the illegal ones. 195 In light of the plaintiffs failure to
provide proper notification, the court did not find it necessary to analyze
prong three of the test or the agent requirement.' 96 Instead, the court
deemed that eBay automatically fulfilled the requirements of the take down
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. § 512(c).
188. Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1083-95 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
189. Id. at 1087. The plaintiff argued that under the contributory copyright liability
portion of Fonovisa, he stated a claim for relief against eBay. Id.
190. Id. at 1087-88. Without much analysis, the court concluded that eBay qualified as
an online service provider, as per the DMCA's requirements in 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). Id.
(stating that the court in Fonovisa allowed the plaintiff to state a claim for contributory
copyright liability against the flea market operator for the infringements of individual
vendors).
191. Id. at 1088. See supra note 171 and accompanying text for the text of § 512(c).
192. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
193. See id; see also supra notes 178, 181 and accompanying text.
194. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. See supra notes 178-87 for the notice
requirements.
195. See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1090-91. The court noted that exact
identification of the infringing listings may not be necessary in all circumstances. Id. at
1090. For example, only the title is necessary when no legal copies of a movie exist. Id.
196. Id. at 1092 & n.13.
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prong because no action is required by the SP without proper notification
by the rights holder.1 97
Under the second prong, the court held that eBay did not have the right or
ability to control the infringing activity, so a determination of its financial
interest was moot. 198 The court explicitly rejected the plaintiff's contention
that eBay had the right and ability to control because eBay could take down
listings after notification.1 99  The court reasoned that the plaintiffs
contention directly conflicted with both § 512(c)(1)(C) 200 and the purpose
of the DMCA to provide incentives for preventing infringement. 20 1 The
court further stated that the infringing activity-the actual sale of the illegal
copies of the documentary-"[is] consummated 'offline."' 20 2 Thus, eBay,
never having possessed the goods, does not maintain control like a
traditional auction site.20 3 Because eBay successfully completed all three
prongs of the test, the district court found that the safe harbor provisions of
§ 512(c) protected eBay from liability.20 4
II. TIFFANYINC. V. EBAYINc.: THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
EBAY'S CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
To date, no United States federal court has ruled on the issue of whether
an online auction site can be held contributorily liable for the trademark
infringements of its third-party sellers. 205 As discussed in Parts I.C. 1 and
I.C.2, courts have dealt with similar issues, but only in the physical
world.206 Can these principles effectively translate into cyberspace? How
should the concepts developed in cyber trademark law impact the outcome
of the Tiffany case? This part presents the legal and policy arguments for
and against Tiffany's claim of contributory trademark infringement.
Specifically, this part addresses the elements of the modified test developed
in Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa, namely whether eBay supplied a
necessary product to its infringing users, whether eBay has knowledge or
reason to know about the direct infringement, and whether eBay maintains
direct supervision and control over the instrumentality used to infringe.20 7
Finally, Part II.D addresses the policy arguments for each party.
197. Id. at 1092.
198. Id. at 1093.
199. Id. Section 512(c)(1)(C) requires an SP to quickly remove access to infringing
material upon proper notification. See supra note 171.
200. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
201. Id. at 1093-94; see also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
202. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
203. Id; see also Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1110 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (holding that Amazon.com had no right or ability to control products of third
party vendors, as it never had them in its control).
204. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1094.
205. As a result, the outcome of the Tiffany lawsuit is highly unpredictable.
206. See supra Part I.C.1-2.
207. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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In order to support its groundbreaking lawsuit with existing precedent
and to anticipate eBay's initial motions to dismiss, Tiffany could begin by
restating the Gucci court's conclusion that Lockheed did not foreclose "the
application of contributory [trademark] infringement in the Internet
context. '208 Second, Tiffany could stress that the CDA does not grant
immunity to ISPs for contributory infringement because the CDA did not
intend to alter current intellectual property law. 209 Next, Tiffany must
address the three prongs of the modified test.
A. Did EBay Supply a Necessary Product to Its Infringing Users?
1. Tiffany's Arguments
At the outset, Tiffany must prove that eBay supplied a necessary product
to its infringing users.210 Accordingly, Tiffany could argue that, like the
defendants in the flea market cases,211 eBay provides its infringing users
with the necessary marketplace to sell their counterfeit wares. 212 The direct
infringers "rent" space to list their items through the insertion fee, 213 just as
the traditional vendors rent stall space. In both situations, the sellers could
not complete their infringing activities without the supplied marketplace.214
The situation at bar differs from the service hypothetical presented in Hard
Rock Cafe,215 because here the direct infringers cannot easily find another
source to supply them a marketplace. 216 In fact, an online auction site's
unique characteristics make it the only true marketplace for a variety of
goods that were previously difficult to sell.217
Tiffany could also argue that the tort law analogy from Hard Rock Cafe
applies even though eBay's premises are virtual.218 EBay, like a traditional
landlord, maintains self-contained premises 219 to which it has permitted
individual sellers to enter.220 Therefore, it too should be responsible for the
torts committed by those permitted entry onto its property.22 1
208. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(internal quotation omitted).
209. Id. at 421. See supra note 147 for the text of the CDA.
210. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
211. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996).
212. Complaint, supra note 4, para. 21.
213. See Creating a Seller's Account, supra note 40.
214. See Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (D.
Md. 2001).
215. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1148 (7th Cir. 1992).
216. See supra note 33.
217. See id.
218. See HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149 (drawing an analogy between a manufacturer
or distributor and a landlord who "is responsible for the torts of those it permits on its
premises" if it has knowledge of the illegal activities committed by those on its premises).
219. See EBay, supra note 1.
220. See How to Sell, supra note 38.
221. See HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
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2. EBay's Arguments
To contest Tiffany's position, eBay could argue that it is only a virtual
venue. 222 As a venue, eBay supplies no necessary products, but only
services to its users.223 Unlike the operators in the flea market cases, eBay
did not provide sellers with tangible real estate, parking, or plumbing.224
Instead, it supplies vendors with a service package that includes posting a
listing, running an auction through automated services, and emailing the
winning bidder. 225 Similar to the service provider hypothetical employed in
Hard Rock Cafe, the vendors could have gone elsewhere for eBay's
temporary services.226 They could have sold their products directly by
using classified advertisements, their own websites, or even a card table on
a street comer. Indirect options, such as boutiques, also present an
alternative. EBay and the other online auction sites do not maintain the
only alternative market for silver jewelry.
Finally, in response to the landlord tort responsibility contention initially
presented in Hard Rock Cafe,227 eBay could argue that even if virtual space
is considered a product, the illegal transaction does not occur in the virtual
space because it occurs through the mail.228 Thus, eBay does not incur the
same responsibility required by Hard Rock Cafe.
B. Does EBay Have Knowledge or a Reason to Know of the Direct
Infringement?
1. Tiffany's Arguments
To prevail on its claim, Tiffany must also argue that eBay has knowledge
or reason to know of the direct infringement.229 However, without more
factual information, the argument that eBay knew of the direct infringement
of Tiffany's trademarks are merely conjectural. Because willful blindness
equals actual knowledge for the purpose of the Lanham Act,230 the
arguments in support of willful blindness are relevant here. Under this
222. See Your User Agreement, supra note 34.
223. See id.; cf Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions., Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th
Cir. 1999) (identifying registration of domain names to be a service, not a product).
224. See EBay, supra note 1.
225. How to Sell, supra note 38.
226. See Fare Deals, Ltd. v. World Choice Travel.com, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (D.
Md. 2001); Meg and the Power of Many, supra note 12, at 66 (reporting that "Ms. Whitman
[eBay's chief executive officer] scowls: the notion that users have no alternatives is, she
says 'awfully arrogant').
227. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149
(7th Cir. 1992) (likening a landlord's liability under tort law to a manufacturer or
distributor's liability under Inwood).
228. See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
229. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
230. HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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subjective standard, 231 Tiffany could argue that because eBay admittedly
monitors its listings,232 eBay could clearly see that many sellers offer
multiple pieces of new Tiffany jewelry priced well below retail. 233
Suspicion may also develop after users report that certain sellers are
offering counterfeit goods. 234 Either of these circumstances could lead
eBay to suspect wrongdoing because, unlike the plaintiff in Hard Rock
Cafe,235 Tiffany has publicized that it is the sole source for new authentic
Tiffany jewelry. 236 Although eBay refuses to take real responsibility for
actively investigating all sellers who fall into the above categories, 237 eBay
does provide its buyers with an optional service, for a small fee, where an
independent party authenticates listings at the buyer's request. 238 EBay
could employ this authentication service itself in an effort to prevent the
sale of counterfeit items after screening the listings using automated
means.239 Nevertheless, doing so would likely reduce eBay's profits
because a decrease in listings by counterfeiters will result in a decrease in
fees.240
Alternatively, Tiffany could argue that eBay simply had a reason to know
of the direct infringers because their existence is very obvious from the
evidence described above. 241 The additional arguments in support of the
objective standard that eBay has reason to know 242 stem from practices that
are likely common to most online auction sites. Tiffany could argue that a
reasonable online auction site operator browses its website for operational
purposes.2 43 Such a reasonable entity would also keep records and statistics
about the fees paid by each type of seller, the most frequently entered
search terms in each category and other similar information. Despite the
large number of listings, the operator could still come across individual
sellers who offer numerous pieces of new Tiffany jewelry for sale below
231. HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1151 n.5.
232. My Listing Was Removed Through VeRO, supra note 70.
233. In its complaint, Tiffany argues that "any seller of a significant lot-i.e., five pieces
or more-of purported 'Tiffany' jewelry at a discount is almost certainly selling counterfeit
merchandise." Complaint, supra note 4, para. 11. EBay would not have to know the exact
retail prices of Tiffany jewelry to determine that the prices listed on eBay are lower than
retail. The reader is invited to conduct a similar experiment on www.ebay.com.
234. See EBay Help: Contact Us,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/contact-us/base/index.html?tier0-report-listing.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2005).
235. See HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
236. See Complaint, supra note 4, paras. 10-11.
237. Cohen, supra note 21, at 91.
238. Authentication FAQs, http://pages.ebay.com/help/confidence/authentication-
faq.html#sp3 (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
239. See id.
240. See EBay.com Fees, supra note 41.
241. See EBay, supra note 1; see, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text.
242. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1149, 1151 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 119.
243. See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1146.
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retail price. 244 This could provide eBay with a reason to know about the
counterfeiting.
Additionally, Tiffany could employ some of the suggested factors from
Mini Maid to support a finding that eBay had knowledge of the
counterfeiting under either of the two knowledge theories. 245 First, Tiffany
could point to the communication, however automated, between the direct
infringers and eBay about the infringing listings. 246  The sellers
communicate to eBay by listing their items, describing them, and providing
photographs. 247 EBay communicates by sending automated emails about
the listings as well as the bids and the final winner.248 EBay also offers its
sellers Sales Reports that include detailed information on a seller's
activities. 249 Logically, this amount of communication about the infringing
activity must lead to knowledge by eBay.250 Second, the sheer volume and
repeated infringements taking place on eBay's website could also lead to
the conclusion that eBay must know about the infringement. 25 1
2. EBay's Arguments
In response, eBay could stress that actual knowledge requires knowing
the exact contents of each and every new listing.252 Last year, eBay
reported more than 1.3 billion listings.253 In addition, eBay would have to
be able to distinguish counterfeit items from real ones without ever actually
possessing the items.2 54 Even eBay's voluntary attempts to monitor its site
244. Complaint, supra note 4, para. 11.
245. Mini Maid Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., Inc., 967 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir.
1992) (suggesting that district courts look at "the nature and extent of the communication[s]"
regarding the infringement, "the extent and nature of the violations," and the existence of a
contractual power to stop infringement); see also supra notes 127-30 and accompanying
text.
246. See Mini Maid, 967 F.2d at 1522.
247. How to Sell, supra note 38.
248. Id.
249. Sales Reports Overview, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/sales-reports-ov.html (last
visited Sept. 29, 2005).
250. See Mini Maid, 967 F.2d at 1522.
251. See id.
252. Sellers maintain the ability to revise their listings throughout the auction, which
suggests that effective monitoring by eBay must be continuous. See Revising Your Listing,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/edit listing.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
253. EBay Annual Report, supra note 25, at 22. This figure includes all non-store
listings, regardless of whether anyone won the auction or it was removed. Id. at 23.
254. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1149 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1090-91
(C.D. Cal. 2001); Bunnell, supra note 33, at 140. Moreover, in Hendrickson, the court
explained that "eBay has no involvement in the final exchange and generally has no
knowledge whether a sale is actually completed (i.e., whether payment exchanges hands and
the goods are delivered)." Hendrickson, 955 F.2d at 1094. However, with eBay's acquisition
of Paypal, an online payment system used in a large number of eBay auctions, eBay now has
knowledge about payments. See Meg and the Power of Many, supra note 12, at 67. For
more information on Paypal, see Paypal, http://www.paypal.com (last visited Sept. 29,
2005).
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for counterfeits 255 could not rise to the level of actual knowledge because
this enormous task would require an army of employees to review each
listing for counterfeits. 256 This army would also have to become experts in
the unique characteristics of trademarked goods, a task better suited to those
who actually make the goods. However, eBay could also stop voluntary
monitoring because case law indicates that it does not have a duty to
monitor.257
To refute Tiffany's argument that eBay is willfully blind, eBay need only
point to its lack of knowledge concerning its countless listings.258
Knowledge about its listings is necessary to create the suspicion of
wrongdoing required for willful blindness. 259 Moreover, acquisition of this
knowledge runs contrary to eBay's laissez-faire philosophy. 260 Under this
subjective standard,261 eBay's admitted voluntary monitoring 262 does not
equate to willful blindness because eBay could argue that it does not
possess the ability to distinguish genuine goods from counterfeits.263
Alternatively, eBay could rebut Tiffany's proposal that sellers who list
more than five Tiffany products at the same time are likely infringers, 264 by
pointing to sellers who legally sell five Tiffany items simultaneously.
Similarly, the "objective reason to know" standard must take into account
the more than 1.3 billion listings265 that a reasonable online auction
operator must view in order to have a reason to know.266 Unlike the
defendants in the flea market cases, eBay maintains a website instead of
actual premises. 267 Because eBay has no duty to monitor under the
applicable case law,268 no reasonably prudent online auction operator would
have reason to know about the minuscule amount of fraud taking place on
its site.
255. My Listing Was Removed Through VeRO, supra note 70.
256. Bunnell, supra note 33, at 56. As of 2000, eBay employed fewer than 500 people.
Id. at 113.
257. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir.
1999); Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. Without an affirmative duty to monitor its
website, eBay could easily discontinue all current monitoring methods and then claim that it
has no actual knowledge or even a reason to know about any infringements that occur
through the auctions. See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
258. See HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
259. See id.
260. Bunnell, supra note 33, at 140.
261. See supra note 121.
262. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
263. See HardRock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
264. Complaint, supra note 4, para. 11.
265. EBay Annual Report, supra note 25, at 22.
266. See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
267. See EBay, supra note 1.
268. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir.
1999); Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
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C. Does EBay Maintain Direct Supervision and Control over the
Instrumentality Used to Infringe?
1. Tiffany's Arguments
Tiffany must also prove that eBay maintains direct control and
supervision over the instrumentality used to infringe, namely the virtual
space known as eBay.com. Accordingly, Tiffany could argue that in the
same way that flea market operators maintain supervision and control, eBay
wields control over and supervises its virtual premises. 269 To begin with,
eBay has rules of conduct, contained in the user agreement,270 and it also
monitors the activities of its virtual space.271 Without the influence of the
Hendrickson ruling, 272 Tiffany might contend that eBay's control and
supervision derives from its power to search and take down infringing
listings.273 Additionally, Tiffany might also argue that eBay's power to
prescreen listings demonstrates control. EBay could easily set up electronic
bots274 that could "automatically... screen out and remove from its
database all listings by sellers of five or more pieces of Tiffany jewelry. ' 275
Tiffany could then argue that, having met all three parts of the modified
test, a court could find eBay contributorily liable for the trademark
infringements of its users. 276
2. EBay's Arguments
To refute Tiffany's arguments regarding supervision and control, eBay
must emphasize that supervision has only been acknowledged in traditional
premises, where the alleged contributory infringer possesses the counterfeit
goods. 277 EBay could then argue that this doctrine cannot be extended into
the virtual world because the doctrine was premised upon a relatively small
and manageable space. 278 The virtual space that makes up eBay's website
269. Lockheed, 194 F.3d at 985.
270. Your User Agreement, supra note 34.
271. My Listing Was Removed Through VeRO, supra note 70.
272. See supra notes 188-204 and accompanying text. Application of this holding is
restricted to contributory copyright infringement. See supra notes 188-204.
273. See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093-94.
274. A bot is defined as "[a] software program that imitates the behavior of a human, as
by querying search engines or participating in chatroom or... discussions." The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000), available at
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=bot.
275. Complaint, supra note 4, para. 34.
276. See supra notes 116-17.
277. See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1094 (concluding that having never had
possession of the goods, eBay cannot render any control, unlike a traditional auction house);
see also Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1110 (W.D. Wash. 2004)
(holding that Amazon.com had no right and ability to control products of third-party
vendors, which it never had in its physical possession).
278. See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143,
1148 (6th Cir. 1992).
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does not reflect either of these characteristics. 279 Most importantly, the
sheer number of listings posted per minute inhibits eBay's ability to take
real control of its operations.280  Therefore, eBay cannot maintain
supervision according to the standards in Hard Rock Cafe or Fonovisa.
Moreover, as Judge Robert J. Kelleher explained in Hendrickson, eBay
could argue that its ability to remove infringing listings after a complaint
does not demonstrate control.281 Even though Judge Kelleher based his
reasoning on the DMCA,282 his rationale also applies in the trademark
context. If eBay's ability to remove listings upon notification of their
illegality demonstrates control, online auction sites would have no incentive
to cooperate with rights owners when notified of trademark infringement. 283
Instead, auction sites would likely eliminate all voluntary cooperative
measures for fear of a court ruling that they have control.284 Thus, finding
that eBay currently holds control over instrumentalities used by infringers
would be counterproductive for trademark owners. 285 Having failed to
meet the requirements of the modified test, eBay could argue that it cannot
be held contributorily liable.
D. Policy Arguments
1. Tiffany's Arguments
Tiffany could find further support for its arguments in Lanham Act and
cyberspace policies. By holding eBay financially accountable for the vast
amounts of counterfeiting occurring on its site, a court would force eBay to
work to greatly decrease the number of infringements. 286 Without a
financial reason to prevent counterfeiting, eBay's incentives to not prevent
counterfeiting, insertion and final value fees, take priority.287 Holding eBay
accountable would enable trademark owners to protect the goodwill they
have built in their marks without extensive and costly litigation against each
individual seller.2 88 Further, absolving eBay of any liability would almost
equate to condoning trademark infringement on Internet auction
websites.289 Incidents of trademark infringement on the Internet would
likely increase.290
279. See EBay, supra note 1.
280. See supra note 70.
281. Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093-94.
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. See id; Bunnell, supra note 33, at 140.
285. See Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1093-94; Bunnell, supra note 33, at 140.
286. See Complaint, supra note 4.
287. See Complaint, supra note 4, para. 35; supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
288. See Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 584, 588 (7th Cir. 1989); cf In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing suing individual
copyright infringers as futile and unhelpful to the larger problem).
289. See The Comm. on Trademarks, supra note 6, at 255-56.
290. See id.
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Tiffany could also argue that the decrease in counterfeit goods offered
through eBay will protect consumers from confusion. 291 Online consumers
do not have the ability to physically inspect goods before purchase, so they
can be more easily confused by misuse of trademarks. Knowing that
trademarks indicate only genuine goods on eBay will therefore help
consumers. 292 The decrease in counterfeiting on eBay will also reduce the
amount of post-sale confusion that results when the public later views
counterfeit goods purchased on eBay.293 Moreover, this practice will help
eBay by "enhanc[ing] its image and reputation as a safe place to trade. '294
Finally, it may also generally promote e-commerce by encouraging overly
careful consumers and merchants to participate.
2. EBay's Arguments
EBay also has supporting Lanham Act and e-commerce policy arguments
on its side. If eBay's cooperation with trademark holders demonstrates
eBay's ability to control, then future online auction sites will not voluntarily
cooperate with trademark holders. Tiffany's own efforts show that
trademark owners can effectively work with eBay under the current VeRO
system to prevent thousands of counterfeit sales on the site.295
EBay could argue that, in order to protect and encourage development of
the Internet, courts must not place hefty burdens on Internet companies.296
Specifically, holding eBay accountable will impose a great financial burden
on eBay and the eBay community. 297 As a result of eBay's financial
success, the company continually expanded its operations throughout the
world and created highly effective technologies that make the eBay
experience better for consumers. 298 With the huge financial burden of
preventing counterfeiting, eBay would likely scale back its geographic
expansion and its development of new Internet technologies. 299 Most
importantly, eBay would likely pass its new costs on to its customers
through a fee increase. 300  If the costs of preventing counterfeit sales
became too high, eBay might need to stop selling trademarked goods.301
Ultimately, eBay's community of sellers and buyers will suffer.302
291. See Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 218 (1st Cir. 1989).
292. See id.
293. See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1955).
294. Bunnell, supra note 33, at 56.
295. Tiffany worked with eBay to remove 19,000 counterfeit auctions in a five-month
period. Complaint, supra note 4, para. 37.
296. See The Comm. on Trademarks, supra note 6, at 255.
297. See Bunnell, supra note 33, at 56.
298. See Sellers, supra note 23, at 174, 178.
299. See The Comm. on Trademarks, supra note 6, at 255.
300. See id.
301. See EBay Quarterly Report, supra note 12, at 52.
302. See The Comm. on Trademarks, supra note 6, at 255.
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Therefore, eBay could argue that consumers' best interests require that
eBay should not be held contributorily liable for users' direct infringements.
III. RESOLUTION
As demonstrated in Part II, both Tiffany and eBay maintain strong
positions on the issue of eBay's contributory liability for the direct
infringement of its third-party sellers. 30 3  Unfortunately, the current
contributory trademark jurisprudence does not necessarily indicate who
should win.304 More importantly, the policy arguments on both sides reveal
two unacceptable resolutions to the problem. 30 5 If Tiffany prevails, eBay,
in its current state, cannot continue to exist.30 6 Eventually, eBay, and all
other online auction websites, could be forced to cease selling new
trademarked goods or even close their virtual doors.30 7 On the other hand,
if eBay triumphs, trademark infringement on the Internet will likely
increase, giving rise to more consumer confusion and a decrease in the
goodwill of many trademarks. 30 8  Neither outcome is desirable.
Fortunately, another option exists. Congress, as it did with the parallel
problem of contributory copyright infringement on the Internet, 30 9 should
enact a digital safe harbor amendment to the Lanham Act to deal with the
increase of Internet-based trademark infringement. Part III.A explains the
proposed safe harbor for contributory trademark liability for online auction
sites, which is substantially based on the DMCA safe harbor. Part III.B
concludes that a limited duty to monitor must be added to the safe harbor.
Finally, Part III.C addresses the remaining issue of an online auction site's
right and ability to control.
A. A Safe Harbor from Contributory Trademark Liability for Online
Auction Sites
Notwithstanding the difference between copyright and trademark,310
Congress should enact an amendment parallel to the DMCA safe harbor 311
to deal with contributory trademark infringement on the Internet. The same
justifications would be valid: (1) to encourage the development of the
Internet, (2) to present incentives for online auction sites and rights owners
to cooperate in identifying and managing infringement in the digital
environment, and (3) to offer guidance to online auction sites on their
303. See supra Part II.
304. See supra Part I.C-D.
305. See supra Part II.D.
306. See supra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 289-91.
309. See supra Part I.D.
310. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 171-87 and accompanying text for the DMCA's safe harbor
provision.
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direct, contributory, and vicarious liability for infringements by their
users.
312
Therefore, this Note proposes that Congress enact a safe harbor
provision 313 that protects online auction sites from contributory trademark
liability if they comply with a three-part statute based on knowledge,
financial benefit, and prompt take-down procedures. First, in order to
benefit from the safe harbor, the online auction site must not possess either
knowledge of the direct trademark infringement or knowledge of conditions
that make the infringement obvious. If it gains knowledge of the direct
infringement or the conditions that make it obvious, then the online auction
site must promptly take down the infringing listing or prevent the infringing
item from being listed. Second, the online auction site must not earn money
as a direct result of the infringing activity if it possesses control over the
instrumentality used to infringe. Finally, if a representative of the
trademark owner alerts the online auction site of an infringing listing
according to the prescribed notification procedures, then the site must
quickly take down the listing.
Additionally, the safe harbor would require that a qualifying online
auction site appoint an agent to receive notifications of trademark
infringement by its users.314 The contact information of this agent must be
readily accessible on the online auction site's webpage.
312. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
313. The proposed amendment is substantially based on the safe harbor provision of the
DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). For the original text, see supra note 171. The amendment
would provide as follows:
§ 1 Limitations on Liability Relating to Goods Sold Online
(A) Online Auction Sites/Houses
(1) In general. An online auction site shall not be liable for monetary relief, for
injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of trademark by reason of direct
infringement of a third-party seller, if the online auction site:
(a) (i) does not have actual knowledge of the direct infringement; or
(ii) in the absence of actual knowledge, does not have a reason to know,
through knowledge of facts and circumstances from which the infringing
activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to take
down or prevent the listing of the infringing material;
(b) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the online auction site has the right and ability to
control the instrumentality used to infringe; and
(c) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (2),
responds expeditiously to take down the listing that is claimed to be infringing.
314. The proposed amendment would read as follows:
(2) Designated Agent. The limitations on liability established in this subsection
apply to an online auction site only if the site has designated an agent to receive
notifications of claimed infringement described in paragraph (3), by making
available through its website in a location easily accessible to the public,
substantially the following information:
(a) the name, address, phone number, and electronic mail address of the agent.
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Like the DMCA notification, 315 the proposed notification has seven
necessary elements. 316 The written notification must include a signature,
physical or electronic, by an authorized representative of the trademark
owner. The complaint must identify the owner's trademark, the infringing
listing, and any information necessary to locate the listing. The
representative must also include her contact information, along with a
statement that she has a good faith belief in the existence of the trademark
infringement. Finally, the representative should include a statement
attesting to the truthfulness of the notification and a certification under
penalty of perjury that she is the trademark owner's authorized
representative. If the complaint includes only the identification of the
trademark, the representative's contact information, and the infringing
listing, the online auction must alert the complaining party to the missing
elements. However, noncompliant notifications will not give rise to
315. See supra notes 178-86 and accompanying text for the DMCA's notification
requirements.
316. The notification requirements would be the following:
(3) Elements of notification
(a) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed infringement
must be a written communication provided to the online auction site that includes
substantially the following:
(i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf
of the owner of the trademark that is allegedly infringed.
(ii) Identification of the trademark claimed to have been infringed, or, if
multiple trademarks'at a single online site are covered by a single notification,
a representative list of such trademarks.
(iii) Identification of the listing that is claimed to be infringing and that is to
be taken down, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the online
auction site to locate the listing.
(iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the online auction site to
contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if
available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be
contacted.
(v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of
the trademark in the manner complained of is not authorized by the trademark
owner, its agent, or the law.
(vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under
penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of
the owner of the trademark that is allegedly infringed.
(b) (i) Subject to clause (ii), a notification from a trademark owner or from a
person authorized to act on behalf of the trademark owner that fails to comply
substantially with the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall not be considered
under paragraph (A)(1)(a) in determining whether an online auction site has
actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent.
(ii) In a case in which the notification that is provided to the online auction
site fails to comply substantially with all the provisions of subparagraph (a)
but substantially complies with clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (a),
clause (i) of this subparagraph applies only if the online auction site promptly
attempts to contact the person making the notification or takes other
reasonable steps to assist in the receipt of notification that substantially
complies with all the provisions of subparagraph (a).
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knowledge of the direct trademark infringement or of the conditions that
make infringement obvious.
Finally, the proposed safe harbor includes a broad definition of the term
"online auction site." 317 The definition embraces both fixed-price sales and
auction sales in order to include all types of retail sites that could be sued
under contributory trademark liability for the infringement actions of third
parties.318
By providing online auction websites who follow the prescribed behavior
with a safe harbor, the proposed amendment provides online auction sites
with guidance as to their liability. 319  Auction websites with actual
knowledge of their users' direct infringements who take down the listings
of infringing goods will provide the easiest cases for applying the proposed
safe harbor.320 Under this safe harbor, courts will also likely not have
trouble dealing with cases involving improper notification, as defined in
section I (A)(2). 321 Hopefully, most online auction sites will fit into the first
category.
Notwithstanding the proposed amendment's balance between the goals of
trademark owners, the public, and online auction sites, the proposal does
not resolve all of the issues with respect to eBay's contributory liability.
First, the proposed amendment does not dictate whether eBay has a duty to
monitor its website for infringements. Second, the proposal does not state
whether eBay has the right and ability to control the instrumentality used to
infringe. In Parts III.B and III.C, this Note argues that while eBay does
have a limited duty to monitor its listings, it does not currently have the
right or ability to control the instrumentality used to infringe.
B. The Duty to Monitor
In keeping with the goals of the proposed amendment 322 and the spirit of
eBay's business model, 323 this Note also proposes that a limited monitoring
obligation be added to the safe harbor requirements. 324 In an effort to
317. The proposed definition is as follows:
(4) For the purposes of this section, an online auction site includes, but is not limited
to, a website that allows third parties to offer their goods for sale on the online
auction's website at fixed prices or to the highest bidder.
318. In seeking to include all retailers who allow third-party sellers to offer goods through
their websites, this definition admittedly expands the concept of an online auction site
beyond common understanding. However, this expansion is deemed necessary because of
the increasing number of sites that allow independent sellers to offer goods for sale. For
example, see Amazon.com's zShops at Amazon.com Help: About zShops,
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/537854/ref=-_x/104-5855768-6107136?
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
319. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
320. See supra Part III.A-B.
321. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
324. The monitoring obligation would be as follows:
§ l(A)(1)
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cooperate with rights owners, online auction sites must implement
automated monitoring of their listings to detect sellers who simultaneously
offer multiple goods 325 with the same trademark 326 or sellers who
consistently list goods with a specific trademark. The monitoring system
should flag all sellers who fall into the above categories for review by a
staff member and possibly a representative of the trademark owner to
determine the legality of the sellers' conduct. Then, any infringing listings
must be taken down expeditiously. Because the volume of daily listings
would prevent an online auction site from screening all of them before the
listings become public without detrimental delay,327 the monitoring system
must scan all listings within forty-eight hours of posting.328 However, an
online auction site could choose to scan all listings beforehand.
Additionally, to prevent counterfeiting users from modifying their listing
after the scanning process,329 online auction sites must also scan all listings
at the close of auction. Any sellers with listings found to be in violation at
closing will be reported to the trademark owners and flagged for further
monitoring. The information gained through this monitoring process will
be used to determine if an online auction site has knowledge of direct
trademark infringement or conditions that make the infringement
obvious. 330 Importantly, online auction sites will have time to implement
the proposed monitoring procedures. 331 In the end, the duty to monitor
must fall substantially on the online auction site because the site reaps
profits, however indirectly or limited, from the direct infringement by its
users.
332
(d) implements an automated monitoring system designed to flag, within forty-
eight hours of listing, all third-party sellers who:
(i) simultaneously list a significant number of items with the same trademark;
or
(ii) consistently list goods with a specific trademark; and
(e) implement an automated monitoring system designed to flag all listings
according to (d)(i) and (ii) at the close of the auction. Sellers with flagged
listings under this subsection will be turned over to the trademark owner and
identified for further monitoring by the online auction site.
(f) The knowledge gained from the monitoring process in subsections (d) and (e)
will be considered under paragraph (A)(1)(a) in determining whether an online
auction site has actual knowledge or is aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent.
325. Trademark owners who wish to participate in this automated system should conduct
a reliable study to determine the minimum number of trademarked goods that a seller needs
to simultaneously offer in order to be flagged by the monitoring system. Once determined,
the number will not be released to eBay users.
326. See Complaint, supra note 4, para. 34.
327. See supra notes 70, 253.
328. If the volume of listings on an auction website greatly increases, this time period
should be reviewed and adjusted accordingly.
329. See Revising Your Listing, supra note 252.
330. Thus, the flagging and the monitoring will often provide for facts and circumstances
that make infringing activity apparent.
331. Without a grace period, eBay and other online auction sites would almost
undoubtedly not meet the monitoring provision.
332. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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C. The Right and Ability to Control
In the trademark context, eBay's ability to take down listings after
notification of an infringement must not equate with eBay's right and
ability to control. This conclusion is based on the Hendrickson court's
rejection of the argument that eBay had the right and ability to control
because of its ability to take down listings after notification in the copyright
context.
333
Namely, under the proposed amendment, such a finding would contradict
section l(A)(1)(c). 334 This section requires that online auction sites take
down listings after proper notification in order to receive the protection of
the safe harbor.335 Holding that an online auction site has the right and
ability to control through this action would likely force liability under
section l(A)(1)(b) 336 because currently most online auction sites do receive
a direct financial benefit from third-party counterfeiters. 337 Additionally,
the Hendrickson court's argument that such a finding would contradict the
aim of the DMCA to encourage cooperation among rights owners and SPs
also holds true in the trademark context.338 However, this Note leaves open
the possibility that eBay may have the right and ability to control based on
an alternative set of facts.
CONCLUSION
If enacted, the proposed safe harbor amendment should help prevent
disputes like the one between Tiffany and eBay. Under the proposed safe
harbor, if eBay chose 339 to implement the monitoring provisions340 and
followed the appropriate take-down procedures, 341 Tiffany would not have
a claim of contributory trademark liability. Instead, Tiffany's complaint
that eBay facilitated the sale of counterfeit Tiffany jewelry 342 would be
resolved. Namely, eBay's users could not sell multiple pieces of Tiffany
jewelry simultaneously or repeatedly.343 Alternatively, if eBay chose not to
implement the monitoring procedures or not to follow the appropriate take-
down requirements, Tiffany could have a claim of contributory trademark
infringement against eBay. In such a case, a court would have to analyze
the factual situation under the current common law test.344 However, this
333. See supra notes 199-201.
334. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
337. See, e.g., supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
339. EBay would likely choose to alter its practices to fit into the proposed safe harbor, as
it did with the DMCA's safe harbor. See supra note 64.
340. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
344. See supra Part II. As demonstrated in Part II, the outcome of this case is highly
unpredictable under existing precedent.
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Note posits that eBay would likely follow the proposed safe harbor
requirements because it attempts to adhere to the DMCA's safe harbor
requirements. 345
Therefore, in the same way as Congress responded to the epidemic of
digital copyright infringement with the DMCA, 346 it must now take action
to curb the influx of trademark infringement taking place through online
auction sites. 347 Without legislative intervention, the courts will be faced to
choose between two detrimental options: Either they could absolve the
sites of liability and effectively freely allow trademark infringement on
online auction sites,348 or they could severely burden auction sites' unique
and valuable marketplace 349 with liability, possibly to the point of
extinction. 350  As technology develops and the marketplace evolves,
Congress must continually amend trademark law in order to stay true to the
Lanham Act's original goals. 351
345. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part I.D. 1 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 299-302 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 28-33, 217 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 77 and accompanying text for the Lanham Act's supporting policies.
[Vol. 74
